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This short paper shows that under the Bank of Japan’s Zero Interest Rate Policy 
and Quantitative Monetary Easing, not just the levels of money market rates but 
also the dispersion of rates across banks have fallen to near zero. Using the data 
on individual banks’ Negotiable Certificate of Deposit rates, we first show that the 
dispersion of the rates among banks has fallen since 1999, the year of the 
adoption of the Zero Interest Rate Policy and reached almost zero by 2004. We 
next show that the fall in the dispersion of the rates is not explained by a 
corresponding fall in the dispersion of the credit ratings of the banks. Rather, 
credit risk premiums seem to have disappeared in the money market. We also 
discuss possible relationships between this result and the Bank of Japan’s 
monetary policy.   
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 I.  Introduction 
     This paper analyzes the effects of the Bank of Japan’s (BOJ) monetary policy during 
recent years, namely, the so-called zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) and quantitative monetary 
easing policy (QMEP)
1, on credit risk premiums demanded of Japanese banks in the money 
market. 
There is a growing literature on the effectiveness of monetary policy near the zero 
lower bound on interest rates.
2 The literature mostly focuses on the effects of monetary policy 
on interest rates on safe assets such as government bills and bonds. An often neglected, yet 
significant aspect of the ZIRP and/or QMEP has been their effects on the credit risk premiums 
financial institutions pay in the market. That is, the BOJ’s policy has lowered such risk 
premiums to extremely low levels, especially in the money market. As a result, not just the 
levels, but also the dispersion among banks of money market rates have been reduced to near 
zero. Such reductions in risk premiums have been significant in view of a sharp rise in 
premiums during the 1997-1998 credit/liquidity crunch, which seriously affected the overall 
economy.  
This paper attempts to document such declines in the dispersion of risk premiums 
across banks. In doing so, we look at the market for negotiable certificates of deposits (NCD) 
where data on issuance rates of individual banks’ NCDs are available. Using the data, we first 
show that the standard deviation of the NCD rates among the banks in our sample period rose 
sharply toward the financial crisis of 1997-1998, but has declined since then. In particular, it 
declined with the introduction of the ZIRP and declined further as the BOJ intensified its easy 
policy stance with the QMEP. We then show that the declines in risk premiums cannot be fully 
explained by recent improvements in the creditworthiness of the banks. This is suggestive of the 
role played by the BOJ’s monetary policy. 
In the next section, we present a brief description of the NCDs market in Japan. In 
section 3, we turn to the analysis of the movements of the standard deviation of the NCD rates 
over time. In section 4, we look more precisely at the relationship between the rates individual 
banks pay and the banks’ ratings. We find that the relationship has become looser and looser. We 
discuss some possible interpretations of the results in section 5. 
                                                  
1 The ZIRP, the combination of a zero short term interest rate and a commitment to maintain it until 
deflationary concerns are dispelled, was adopted by the BOJ between April 1999 and August 2000. 
In March 2001, the BOJ introduced the QMEP framework whereby the operational target of policy 
was changed to the current account balances at the BOJ from the overnight call market rate and the 
BOJ promised to maintain the level of the balances well above required reserves until core CPI 
inflation became stably above zero. QMEP can be thought of as a version of ZIRP plus provision of 
reserves well in excess of levels necessary to achieve a zero short term interest rate. The QMEP 
framework is still in place at the time of the writing of this article.   
2 See, for example, Baba et al. [2005]. 
  2II.    The Market for Negotiable Certificates of Deposit (NCDs) 
(i) The amount outstanding of NCDs 
3
The amount outstanding of NCDs issued by Japanese banks (domestically licensed 
banks) has been hovering around 30 trillion yen recently (33 trillion yen as of the end of August 
2004).  Of this total, about 80 percent is issued by major banks, namely city banks and trust 
banks (based on fiscal 2003 averages). Major banks have recently raised around 30 percent of 
their total short term funding needs by issuing NCDs. Thus, NCDs are one of their principal 
instruments for raising operating funds (Chart 1).  
 
(ii) NCD issuance by maturity   
Looking at major banks’ issuance of NCDs by maturity, issuances with maturities of 
less than 30 days account for about 60 percent of the total (again based on fiscal 2003 averages).   
Therefore, market liquidity for NCDs with maturities of less than 30 days is likely to be the 
highest of all the maturity zones (Chart 2). 
 
III. The dispersion of interest rates on newly issued NCDs among major banks 
Interest rates on major banks’ newly issued NCDs had moved broadly in tandem since 
the first NCDs were issued in May 1979. That is, the rates had not reflected the differentials in 
credit risks of the banks. Since the late 1990s, however, the interest rates had started to reflect 
the credit risk of individual issuing banks, partly due to the rising concern over the stability of 
the financial system.
4 This is shown by substantial jumps in the degree of dispersion as 
measured by the standard deviation of the NCD interest rates in November 1997, when concern 
over the financial system instability heightened
5(Chart 3). The standard deviations declined 
significantly, however, after the adoption of the ZIRP and have fallen further following the 
adoption of the QMEP.
6  
It is worth noting that under the QMEP, the standard deviation of the interest rates on 
newly issued NCDs declined to or even below the levels observed in the period up to October 
1997, during which investors rarely cared about differences in individual banks’ credit risks. 
A statistical test on the difference in the average standard deviations between the 
                                                  
3 For an outline of the NCD market in Japan, see Chapter 7 of Totan Research [2002]. 
4 See Totan Research [2002]. 
5 In November 1997, concern over the financial stability heightened following a series of failures of 
four financial institutions: Sanyo Securities (on November 3), Hokkaido Takushoku Bank (on 
November 17), Yamaichi Securities (on November 24), and Tokuyo City Bank (on November 26). 
The concern over the financial instability subsided after the nationalization of Long-Term Credit 
Bank of Japan (October 1998) and Nippon Credit Bank (December 1998). 
6 The same tendency is observed in fund-raising costs via deposits defined as payment of deposit 
interest rates divided by the amount outstanding of deposits. 
  3periods of the ZIRP and QMEP rejected the null hypothesis that the average standard deviations 
during the two periods were equal at the 5 percent significance level for all maturities (less than 
30 days, 60 days, and 90 days) 
7 (Chart 4). 
 
IV. Estimating Credit Curves from Interest Rates on newly issued NCDs 
The interpretation of the preceding section’s finding, declines in the standard deviation 
of NCD issuance rates among banks, is not straightforward. One possible interpretation is that 
financial strains have gradually eased since 1999 and the resultant improvements in the credit 
ratings of the banks have lowered the risk premiums for many banks and hence the standard 
deviation of the rates. In order to statistically address this issue, we estimate credit curves at 
various points in time.   
 
(i) Estimation Method 
First, we define the credit spread of a bank as the interest rate on NCDs newly issued 
by the bank with maturities of less than 30 days minus the weighted average of uncollateralized 
overnight call rate over all banks.
8 Then, we run time series-cross sectional regressions of the 
credit spreads on dummy variables corresponding to sample banks’ credit ratings for each of 
four representative years under study; that is, i) 1997, the year of the financial crisis, ii) 1999, a 
year when the ZIRP was in full swing, iii) 2002, one year after the adoption of the QMEP, and 
iv) 2004, the last year of our sample period.
9 The data on NCD rates are available weekly, 
resulting in about 800-900 observations for each year.
10 Regressions also contain March, 
September and December dummies to control for seasonal market tightness toward year end and 
in annual/semi-annual book-closing months. Estimated credit spreads for each credit rating 
category, i.e., the coefficients on credit rating dummies along with the constant term, map out 
the “credit curve” for each of the four years.   
 
                                                  
7 According to a statistical test on the difference in the average standard deviations between the 
periods of the ZIRP and November 1997 -1999, the null hypothesis that “the average standard 
deviations during the two periods are equal” was not rejected at the 5 percent significance level 
for all maturities due to the large dispersion of interest rates during the period. 
8 Our sample consists of city and trust banks. 
9 Data on NCDs with maturities of less than 30 days were used since NCDs in this maturity category 
have the largest share, possibly resulting in the highest market liquidity. Similar regressions using 
the data on NCDs in other maturity categories, namely less than 60 days and less than 90 days, 
yielded less robust estimation results. 
10 The number of observations for later years is smaller for two reasons. First, there have been 
mergers among banks. Second, some banks were not able to issue NCDs in later years and are not in 
the sample, because their ratings fell below the investment grades. 
  4(ii)  Estimation  result 
The estimation result is shown in Chart 5. Dummy variables for credit ratings are 
statistically significant for almost all cases. Chart 6 draws the credit curves implied by the 
estimation result. The credit curves slope upward for  r a t i n g s  o f  A 2  o r  l o w e r .  I t  i s  s l o p e d  
downward between A1 and A2 for 1999. The number of banks with a rating of A1 or higher, 
however, is very limited for 1999. Thus, it seems that we do not have to take this part of the 
result too seriously. After all, the coefficient on A1 dummy is insignificant for 1999.       
Chart 6 also demonstrates how the slope of the credit curve became flatter over time. 
A notable exception is the movement of the spread at Baa2 rating between 1997 and 1999. This 
coefficient, however, is insignificant even at the 5% level in 1999. Besides this, it seems fair to 
say that the credit curve flattened after the introduction of the ZIRP in 1999, and flattened 
further following the introduction of the QMEP in 2002, before it flattened out in 2004.
11
The estimation result indicates that the credit risk premiums among major banks are 
currently close to zero, and that the differences in credit ratings among them are now hardly 
reflected in their fund-raising costs in the money market. Therefore, the narrower dispersion of 
fund-raising costs among banks, shown in Chart 3, has been a result of declines in risk 
premiums across the board in the money market, rather than by a lower dispersion of credit 
ratings among major banks. 
 
It should be noted that the possibility remains that the reduction in the credit risk 
premium as discussed above has been caused by the government’s policy of “protecting all bank 
debts.” The following observations seem to suggest that this factor does not go as far as 
explaining all the reductions in the risk premiums in the money market after 1999. First, the 
government policy mentioned above had already been made public in November 1997 in a joint 
statement by the Minister of Finance and the Governor of the BOJ. Second, even after the 
release of the statement, credit risk premiums moved up and down in the money markets as 
shown in Chart 3. Third, as is widely known, until recently there remained the dispersion of 
credit risk premiums in the markets for bank debt instruments with relatively long maturities, 
such as bank debentures, subordinated debt, as well as credit default swaps. Such a line of 
                                                  
11 For the 2004 credit curve, we statistically tested for differences in credit risk premiums between 
credit ratings. The null hypothesis that “the credit risk premiums are the same” was not rejected 
between the A2 and Baa2 ratings at the 5 percent significance level, although the null hypothesis 
between the A2 and Baa1 ratings was rejected. This result shows that the credit curve became 
completely flat between the A2 and Baa1 ratings. We also tested for differences in credit risk 
premiums between 1997 and 2004 for the same credit ratings, and found that the null hypothesis that 
“the credit risk premiums are the same” was rejected for all credit ratings. For the difference 
between 2002 and 2004, however, the same null hypothesis was not rejected for all credit ratings 
except A2. This result statistically supports the flattening of the credit curve under the QMEP. 
  5consideration suggests an important role played by monetary policy in reducing risk premiums 
in the money market, to which we now turn. 
 
V.  Discussion 
In this section, we discuss a potential role the BOJ’s monetary policy since 1999 has 
played in reducing risk premiums in the money market. Under the ZIRP, the BOJ targeted 
approximately a zero overnight call market rate. The target was the average of all overnight 
rates banks paid in the call market. Thus, the standard deviation of the overnight rates also had 
to decline to near zero. Otherwise, the average rate could not have been zero. This means that 
the BOJ’s ample supply of liquidity reduced risk premiums to virtually zero at the overnight 
horizon. One might argue that the BOJ’s promise to maintain a zero interest rate until 
deflationary concerns are dispelled played a role here. With this promise market participants 
were assured of a zero interest rate/ample liquidity supply not just today but also in the near 
future. This seems to have reduced, if not completely eliminated, credit risk premiums at the 
short end of the money market. 
The current paper has, however, gone beyond this and showed that the standard 
deviation of rates of longer dated maturities also fell to near zero. Let us note that the promise to 
keep a zero interest rate until deflationary concerns are over (as under the ZIRP) or until CPI 
inflation is positive (as under the QMEP) does not necessarily guarantee a zero interest rate at 
all maturities in the money market. There is always a risk of inflation moving up to positive 
territory, say, within a year.   
 
There seem to be two possible explanations of the near zero dispersion of term rates 
across banks since 1999. First, the BOJ has successively strengthened its commitment to 
maintain a zero rate during this period. Initially, the ZIRP was adopted. Under the QMEP, the 
commitment was clarified to read until “core CPI inflation is stably above zero.” In October 
2003, it was strengthened further to the maintenance of a zero interest rate at least until 
(roughly) actual and expected core CPI inflation are above zero. The stronger promises may 
have lowered both the level and dispersion of term rates. 
The second explanation would emphasize the effects of the BOJ’s fund supplying operations 
on money market rates. As the BOJ raised the target on the current account balances under the 
QMEP, it increasingly had to rely on operations with longer maturities. In April and May of 
2001, the BOJ’s fund-supplying money market operations had maturities of one to three months. 
In March 2005, some operations had a maturity of 11months. As many banks raised funds 
through these operations, the levels and dispersion of term rates seem to have declined. 
Needless to say, the BOJ’s operations have been done either in a repo manner (repurchase 
  6agreements) or by purchasing TBs and FBs in an outright manner. Thus, the term rates that have 
been directly affected by the operations are collateralized interbank rates or TB/FB rates. The 
effects on such rates then seem to have spilled over into uncollateralized money markets 
including the NCD market. On this view, the large BOJ operations with long maturities have 
had the effect of reducing risk premiums in the money market. 
Estimating the exact contribution of each of these two factors to the reduction of the 
dispersion of money market rates is left for future study. At this point, it seems fair to say that 
both have contributed significantly.
12  
The stagnation of the economy, especially after 1997, has been characterized by serious 
strains in the financial system that weighed more heavily on less healthy banks. Thus, the BOJ’s 
policy seems to have supported the economy not just through low interest rates but also by 
lowering liquidity/credit risk premiums banks pay in the money market.     
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Total NCD issuance by banks
(left scale)
Ratio to debt (right scale)
Ratio to financing through the
money market (right scale)
Year
Note:  Ratios  are  calculated based on the banking accounts of domestically licensed banks.  "Financing
through the money market"  refers to the total funds raised through call money, NCDs, bank debentures,
corporate bonds, CP, and  repurchase agreements.
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  9Notes: 
1. The above data are for the following major city banks, long-term credit banks, and trust banks for 
which weekly data are available since September: Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation, the Bank of 
Tokyo-Mitsubishi, UFJ Bank, Resona Bank, Shinsei Bank, Aozora Bank, the Mitsubishi Trust and 
Banking Corporation, the Sumitomo Trust & Banking, Mizuho Trust & Banking, UFJ Trust Bank, and the 
Chuo Mitsui Trust and Banking Company. Data for Fuji Bank and Mizuho Bank are excluded, as a large 
portion of their NCDs were issued to local governments. For Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation prior 
to its merger, data for the former Sumitomo Bank are used.   
 
2. The following periods are considered to be “event periods” and data for these periods are excluded 
from the calculation: (i) the end of 1999 (Y2K problem); (ii) the end of 2000 (preparation for the 
introduction of Real Time Gross Settlement; (iii) the end of fiscal 2001 (the partial removal of blanket 
deposit insurance). When there are missing data for a given bank in a calculation period, that bank is 




  10(Chart4）Test of the difference on dispersion of NCD interest rates 
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standard deviation 
under the ZIRP(A) 
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Y1997 Y1999 Y2002 Y2004




A2 0.113 -0.122 0.006 -0.023
A3 0.139 -0.126 0.014 -0.023
Baa1 0.126 -0.117 0.030 -0.021
Baa2 0.119 -0.081 0.034 -0.014
Baa3 0.194 -0.088 0.043 -0.009
Maturity beyond year-end 0.493 0.191 -0.002
Maturity beyond semi-annual book-closings 0.025 -0.031 -0.006 0.004
Maturity beyond fiscal year-end 0.030 0.038 0.087 0.003
Adj_R
2 0.658 0.253 0.296 0.482
Number of observations 865 826 667 556
Number of banks 18 17 13 13
Aa2 52 0 0 0
Aa3 52 0 0 0
A1 80 8 0 0
A2 128 78 52 60
A3 52 72 202 189
Baa1 227 252 109 178
Baa2 104 262 155 38
Baa3 155 149 149 48
No rating 15 5 0 43
(Chart 5) Estimation Results
 
 
Note: Green, yellow, and blue shadows indicate significance level at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 









Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3
Year 1997
Year 1999
Year 2002
Year 2004
（bp）
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